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I

There are several different strands to Gerald Graff's argument in this highly
polemical book. But no matter what the strand may be-a discussion of Modern
and Postmodern fictions and the differences between them, the New Critics,
Herbert M2.fCUSe, the" therapeutic society" of Philip Rieff, or the predominance
of langu3ge theories in contemporary criticism-they all run irrevocably together:
they limn an image of a pos!romantic culture whose literary excesses reflect a general suspicion of " reason" and" rational understanding" '\vhich has itself, in turn,
led society to lose contact with "indispensable forms of social and historical
understanding." Graff's hope is to "restore the connection" between the" leading forces" of our culture and reason itself: "we will have to revise our
literary assumptions" (p. 239).
Because of the cohesive multiplicity of Graff's book, it is difficult to reject
parts without rejecting the whole. For his argument that so many of the cultural aspects of the literature and criticism of this century have, in their assaults
on the referential aims of writing and reading-to make life intelligible and
coherent by rational analysis from the perspective of a unified philosophY of
life-created the contemporary cultural crisis by subverting all authority, all tradition, and all coherence-this argument can only be accepted if his analysis
of each of the important literary and critical movements is so demonstrative that
his conclusions cannot be resisted. In other words, serious flaws in any of the
individual analyses can subvert the entire text. If, on the contrary, one believes
that Graff's wide-ranging conclusions on behalf of "reason," "intelligibility," and
"referentiality" can survive errors in the argument, this is only so because one
comes to the text already convinced-convinced of a series of statements which
are unarguably value-judgments whose "inevitability" demands detailed and unquestionable demonstration. But, unfortunately, there are many specific objections to Graff's book which undermine its value by making it impossible to
agree rationally with the line of his arguments and his conclusions .
.i\1any partisans on one side or the other of this hydra-headed question of
refcrentiality and "reason" will accept or reject Graff's book out-of-hand.
Certain of his sympathizers have already "\vished that he had been more careful
and graceful-here and there. And, of course, the "uncanny" critics, as Hillis
Miller calls the" de constructors," will be largely unaffected by Literature Against
Itself because it is not a powerful enough text to dislodge them from their various
" de constructive " projects. When placed in the context of these groups especially, Literature Against Itself appears as only another battle (or is it rifle~shot?)
in the tiresome war between" humanistic" and" avant-garde" critics. But, of
course, this struggle-recently spotlighted by the debate between M. H. Abrams
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and Hillis Miller and their friends-should not be considered only in this spotlit
context or even in the slightly broader (and slightly yellow) spotlight of such
popular reviews as The New York Times Book Review, The New York Review
of Books, or The American Scholar. For whether we like it or not, the responsibility for literature is, as much as it has ever been, now in the hands of the
universities where the assumptions and questions regarding literature and society
are worked out in practice everyday in and out of the classroom. The success
or failure of Graff's book, of his project and program, will be determined by
how it is received and used in the academy. For this use will tell truly how the
"war" between "referential humanists" and "avant-garde revisionists" is going,
how the literary, cultural, and political sysmpathies of the society are moving:
toward partisan acceptance or rejection or toward a more "objective" understanding of what specific literary and critical texts represent in a culture at any
given time. To begin to understand what Literature Against Itself represents
one must see initially that it is seriously flawed in its assumptions, methods,
and conclusions and one must then ask what interest might account for these
flaws in an intelligent, largely well-informed, and sometimes subtle text.
For example: it is a central thesis of Graff's book that the decentered, pluralistic, non-referential literary-critical theory and practice of Modernity and Postmodernity is itself a product of advanced capitalism; more specifically, it is an
attempted revision of capitalism's repressive, scientific, representational culture
which has itself been made captive by late capitalism and, hence, has become
the new orthodoxy of consumer society. Modern revisionists have been only
partially (at best) aware of their cooptation precisely because their cultural
rebellion and capitalism'S needs have destroyed any fixed order of norms against
which the usurpation of Modernity's revisionist aesthetic can be seen as such.
"One of my central arguments," writes Graff, "is that the real C avant-garde'
is advanced capitalism, with its built-in need to destroy all vestiges of tradition,
all orthodox ideologies, all continuous and stable forms of reality in order to
stimulate higher levels of consumption" (p. 8). Since space prevents a detailed
critique of Graff's book, this issue must serve as an example of the type of
problem which denies Literature Against Itself the authority it so desperately
desires.
First of all, this argument requires great methodological rigor. Without a
sustained analysis of II advanced capitalism" to tell us what it is, the argument
is groundless. We find it nowhere in the text although there are passing
references to Lukacs (in highly problematic contexts), H. M. Enzensberger, and,
tellingly, Daniel Bell. In place of analytic descriptions of advanced capitalism,
Graff provides mere assertions about its character. This is a crucial omission
in the substantive and methodological underpinnings of the book. But beyond
even this runs a strand of epistemological and methodological naivete. For
example, even though Graff has not described the economic base of our society,
he asserts repeatedly that the cultural superstructure is a mirror of it. This
"base-superstructure" metaphor has been so problematic for so long that
one wonders why Graff feels he can use it so innocently. His way of thinking
about the relation of culture and economy is, unfortunately, simplistic; it is
heavily dependent on the straightforward metaphors of U mirroring" and "anal-
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ogy" (pp. 96-97). He writes as if the theoretical advances in dealing 'with these
problems made by Gramsci, Althusser, Macherey, Elias, and even Foucault did
not exist. His procedure is always one of "common-sense."
But is it not equally "common-sensical" for Graff to ask how it is that he
and some few other neD-conservatives (Christopher Lasch, Wayne Booth, and
Daniel Bell) escape the captivity of history and "advanced oaptalism" to tell
us about its horrors? Graff repeatedly argues that careful attention to the claims
that literature is non-referential, a l{ind of play, absurdity, merely a semiotic
system of codes, the endless substitution of signs reveals that they always
rest on a referential assertion about the world: it is too chaotic to understand,
language can no longer directly refer, or whatever. Thus, Graff argues, the
revisionists contradict themselves at their own foundations. But such an argument is essentially only a powerful debater's trick which confuses levels of discourse and produces apparent contradiction. Yet it reveals Graff's tendency
to turn the arguments of others back against themselves and, hence, it authorizes
others to do the same to him-but on more serious grounds. And when one
does, one is too often surprised to find not only that he can be "trapped" just
as easily by this debater's trick, but also that the blind spots in his argument create
substantial problems. For if advanced capitalism has so po"werfully coopted (or
produced) the non-referential exertions of a Beckett, Roland Barthes, John
Barth, the New Critics, Northrop Frye, James Joyce and T. S. Eliot to some
degree-how then has Graff escaped? Wherein lies his power and privilege?
By what authority has he raised himself out of the superstructure of advanced
capitalism so that he can see it clear and whole?
There are at least two problems here: one is that Graff does not seem
aware that one conclusion of his own position is that his own work is a product
and reflection of late capitalism, i. e., it is itself part of the pluralism of a consumer society despite its lamentations over the demise of a coherent bourgeois
society-it is, after all, on one level, only another commodity being bought and
sold in the spotlit academic arena; the other problem is that Graff does not
explain by "\vhat authority he and a few others have been granted access to
stable norms by virtue of which it is possible to see all of the rest of Postmodem
culture as "distorted," not just different, as "degenerate," not just unauthorized.
What are these norms? Where do they come from? Why has Graff been
blessed with an awareness of them? vVhat is the source of his so palpably present
anxiety over the loss of central authority, of order, of clear" boundaries" (p.
IS)? Modern economy has made the world unreal, and we can only be aware
of this by comparison to something more real. Passing over the historical errors,
one can still find the following statement illuminating: "People in the nineteenth century could see this fact more easily than we can today, for they could
perceive the incursion of this capitalist reality as a profound change-in contrast
to what still remained of the feudal order" Cpp. 8-9). Taken in the context
of other similar remarks, one can see from this statement where Graff's (ideological) sympathies lie-sympathies which control his literary-critical discussions:
with a patriarchal, hierarchical "reality" \vhose presence, or whose lingering
memory, functions as a contrasting ideal against which to measure the unreality
of our revisionist world. Clearly, what is important in all of this is not
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Graff's nostalgia, which is pronounced and barely obscured by his anger, but his
arrogance. This arrogance appears not only in the privileged tone and position
he adopts, bur in the belittling, leveling attitude he assumes toward all those
who deny the priority of "reason," "reality," and" order." "To repudiate art's
representational function," he writes, "is not necessarily to leave no link between
art and reality, but it is to reduce reality to a trivial role in the relationship" (p.
17). This implies that all of Graff's antagonists have wrongheadedly denied the
common-sense priority of "reality" as a matter of (perverse) will. Graff is
not only not very careful about his definitions-what "reality" means is evident
.to "common-sense "-but he shows how violent" common-sense" can be. For
he is not generous enough to admit that there may be a non-common-sensical
li~ved-re{(lity for some who have the misfortune not to be attuned to "norms."
Graff's common-sense judgments of reality and of its antagonists willfully exclude
the lived-experience of those for whom, e. g., the world and man are semiotic
structures. Graff's humanistic common-sense violently denies these different" realities" their legitimacy. The irony, of course, is that many of these anti-referential
theories are clearly as "real" as Graft's own inherited ideas-ideas Kierkegaard
would identify with the crowd and Heidegger with the public world of das Man.
In the name of the wisdom of his fathers, Graff condemns a world without wisdom, without the conditions for it, a world without the necessary remnants of
the past to build a future. The arrogance of common-sense is self-parody and
low comedy.
The most important and dangerous aspect of LiteratU1'e Against Itself is its
concern with authority-a danger that its self-parody will not drive away. Repeating the neo-conservative critiques of Bell and Lasch, Graff claims that
the" relativizing of belief" wInch deEnes Modernity docs not actually free man
from systems of repression and oppression, as is claimed, but, in fact, actually
"dissolves the authority of anything that tr.ies to resist these systems ... " (p.
189). Advances in criticism, for example, which give priority to the act of
reading in the constitution of "meaning" reduce the" author-ity" of a text and
of a writer's intention; it reduces" meaning" to a multiplicity of "readings" (pp.
156 ff.). Criticism, in tIns way, extends the decentralization of authoritative
coherence which Graff hopes to re-establish. In fact, he claims that the theories
of impotence common to Modernity-it is impossible to produce one or a few
authorized meanings; any reading is as good as any other; they arc all
" misreadings "-unknowingly extend the hegemony of late capitalism and, in
fact, in tlns way, gain power. Graff is correct on 'Ll~ level in saying that the
"adversary culture" is now "indistinguishable" from the "adversary," but
the statement is too crude an·d incomplete. vVhere, for example, would one
place Foucault (whom Graff pointedly neglects)? Is he the same as Mareuse
and the New Critics? Where does one put Umberto Eco and Julia Kristeva,
perhaps the two most important and innovative semiohcians? Graff must consider
them in detail before he can reject semiotics out-of-hand (or is it second-hand?).
The rejection of semiotics without a consideration of its central figures and
theories reveals how Graff is indeed doing little more than crudely repeating the
received wisdom of those whose own interests are threatened by revision and
innovation (d. pp. 177 ff.). This accepted wisdom might have been made a
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bit more self-reflexive and a bit less blatant in its self-interest if Graff had been
more aware of the complexities of the contemporary intellectual scene-a scene
filled with figures more aware, more infonned, and sophisticated than he is.
(Compare, for example, Foucault's Discipline and Punish with Graff on the
problems of power and knowledge.)
Yet we must recognize that Graff is also bidding for authority by claiming
that his position is powerlessness-but doing it all the time from the advantage of
the stilI powerful rhetoric of "reality" and "common-sense." Whatever appeal
Literature Against itself has to the academy will be the result of the power of its
conversative rhetoric in a time of increasingly uncomfortable cultural circumstance for the right-but a time, nonetheless, marked by the increasing vigor and
voracity of the right. Errors in the interpretation of Kant (p. 38), lack of
definition of key terms, failures to confront Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, and
others, the questionable priority assigned to Marcuse, Poirier, and Sontag as representatives of Postmodernism-all of these flaws will count for little if the
authority of the conservative rhetoric is not exposed for what it is-an ideological
attempt to regain social "harmony" by appealing to the past and its notions of
soc.ial (bourgeois) order. It must be said that the negativism of this book-a
book which essentially e:cists only as a parasite on major positive work done by
others-is a sign of the dangerous movement of American academic intellectuals
to the right, to the past, and away from the potentialities for the future contained in an admittedly somewhat uncertain present.
Since Graff is fond of affiliating Lukacs to his position, it is worth ending with
a quotation from his 1920 essay, "The Old Culture and the New Culture":
"In bemoaning the collapse of the capitalist order, the bourgeoisie most often
claims that its real concern is with the perishing of culture; -it formulates its
i defense of its class interests as if .the basis of these interests were the eternaJ
values of culture."
PAUL A. EavE
University of Pittsburgh

Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film by Seymour Chatman. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978. Pp. 277. $14.50.
Chatman's Story and Discourse is a structuralist poetics of narrative, bringing
together in a comprehensive, methodical way various elements of structuralist
theory of narrative as it has developed over the last fifty years, and especially in
the syntagmatic studies of the sixties by theorists of the French group: Gerard
Genette, Roland Barthes, and Tzvetan Todorov. The" Story" and « discourse"
of the title are the structures of substance and expression, respectively, of narrative in whatever medium; "story" consists of the signifiers and signifieds-the
latter the "events" and "existents" of narrative-while "discourse" consists of
the precise means and modes of their transmission, the techniques by which the
events and existents are organized and focused: principally, it emerges, what
was called in New Critical parlance" point of view." After a general theoretical
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introduction, the book is about equally divided between consideration of story
and discourse.
In his chapters on story Chatman painstakingly defines and illustrates
such concepts as "sequence," "contingency," "causality/' "vcresimilitude," and
" motivation" in the context of implied audiences' cultural assumptions about
"reality" as well as fictionality. His discussion of the relations of "story time"
and" discourse time," derived from Genette's and finely illustrated with analysis of
examples from familiar novels and films, is the most coherent and readable I have
found, as is his thoughtful consideration of the unresolved problems raised by
attempts to construct typologies of plots. Those of Aristotle, Frye, Crane, Propp,
Todorov, and Bremond are specifically reviewed, concluding with Chatman's
warning that more detailed analysis of the form/content relations of narratives
in the separate genres (such as Barthes' 5/2) remains to be done before a convincing typology can be formulated.
Chatman's discussion of space-I< story space" and <I discourse space H_in
"\vhich the existents (characters and settings) of both fiction and film have their
being illuminates a basic aspect of narrative that, like time, has often been
obscure in theorizing. Tracing the history of theory of character from Aristotle
through the modern structuralists, Chatman advocates an "open theory of character" which treats" characters 2S autonomous beings, not as mere plot functions,"
and provides a detailed definition and grid of "traits" to be used in describing
characters and distinguishing between "events" and "traits 11 in the structure
of a text (not as easy as one might snppose, as Chatman's examples show).
Drawing again upon Barthes' 5/2, Chatman defends the legitimacy of A. C. Bradley's much-maligned psychological method as a "useful and natural way to
analyze characters," so long as one remembers that the characters arc not
"real" people but only, in R. S. Crane's term, <I concrete semblances 11 which we
interpret in part by our knowledge of what "real" people are like: "Iago is
'cold,' not cold." The expos.ition of setting also introduces useful criteria, although in the end Chatman has to recommend further development of "heuristic
principles of categorization."
Most of the second half of Chatman's book is devoted to what he calls the
"discourse," or "expression plane l1 of narrative, its "set of narrative statements ... a certain posture in ballet, a series of film shots, a whole paragraph in a
novel, or only a single word." Having divided such statements into" process"
and" stasis" statements in his introduction, Chatman moves here immediately into
the questions of "mediation," and of the supposed dichotomy of showing and
telling, which he prefers to see as combined in a "spectrum of possibilities
ranging from "non-narrated" to maximally narrated. He gives substantial attention to a "fascinating new personage on the aesthetic horizon," the "narratee"
(discovered, Chatman says, by Gerald Prince), the personage to whom the story
is intentionally told or written.
The whole discussion of narration is facilitated by an incisive demonstration
of the relevance of speech-act theory to analysis of various types of narrative statements, and Chatman surveys the various permutations of narrators with
clarifying expositions of a number of the vexed terms: "interior monologue,"
" stream of consciousness," "indirect free style." One of the most stimulating and
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potentially useful sections is that on different 'kinds of narratorial commentary:
interpretive, judgmental, generalizing. and self-reflexive.
It is possible to object to particular points: Chatman's treatment of the implied
author seems to me a misconstruction of Booth's original definition in Tbe R1Jetoric
of Fiction, and his bald assertion that events, characters, and" details of setting"
arc the only 5ignifieds of narrative statements is at best arguable. Many readers
are lileely to feel a certain discomfort with the basic division posited between
the structure of substance and the structure of the telling (the place of narrarorial commentary, for example, is not altogether clearly in onc camp or the
other), I-Io\.ycver, Chatman's scheme is remarkably workable for the description
and comparison of individual texts. We do well to recall the linguists' maxim:
"all grammars leak." This one proves buoyant and serviceable, nonetheless.
Although written texts arc the primary loci of Chatman's examples, the references to film arc illuminating, not so much as contributions to a complete theory
of film narrative, but as contrasting to the literary examples and further clarifying
what is essential to narrativity per sc. Oddly enough given Chatman's previous
work on style, he devotes little attention to it here, except in the analysis of
direct and indirect representation of speech and mental experience, thus implying
that style is not essential to the structural study of narrative. The second half
of the book is marred by uncorrected errors, some of them jarring (why should
Ford's DO\vell appear as "Dowling;' Joyce's" Two Gallants" as "The Ga1bnts" ?); and the placing of the footnotes at the bottom of the pages, ,vhile
welcome in itself, causes problems when there is no bibliography and no indexing
of m:my individual secondary works and editors.
I have summarized tbe contents of Story and Discourse at length in part simply
to support Chatman's contention that he has dealt, in a reasoned, thorough way,
with all the fundamental issues pertaining to the structures of any and all narrative
texts, and in part to demonstrate how conservative and common-sensical a
theorist he turns out to be. His book aims, successfully, at the advanced student
and teacher of literature who have read The Rhetoric of Fiction and The Nature
of Narrative, and perhaps some work of the Russian and French formaliststructuralist schools. For the most part Chatman resists being drnvn into the
yocabuJary, or the equations and models of post-structuralist semiotics :md deconstruction, or e\"cn of the more extreme positions of his mentors, He puts into
persjJecti"e much structuralist thought on narrative and proyides a refurbished
t;tXOTlomy and a method for comparison and interpretation of narratives in the
same or related genres. Becausc thc book is so clearly written, and its examples
so elegantly analyzed to demonstrate the theory, because it relate:; itself so
firml)' to the tradition inherited from Aristotle, it bids to bceome re'Juired reading
for ~tudents of l13rrati\"c, taking its place on the resen'e sheh'es beside Tbe
Rhctoric of Fiction, Tl.1C Nature Of Narrative, and Cullet's Structuralist Poetics,
pcrh3ps giYing them a nudge into still-respected but less central positions.
SVZAX:;-;E Fr:RGL'SO~

Tl.,c OJ.1:0 State Uni-.:errity
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Dianysas Slain by Mai:cei Detienne, translated by Mireille Muellner and Leonard ·;i
Muellner. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. II
Pp. xiii
BO. $10.95.
'il

+

a

This book, a translation of Dionysos mis mort (1977), is a collection of four
essays on clsssical mythology, united more by their author's structuralist methodolw
ogy than by any intrinsic relationship. The second chapter excepted, all first
appeared as articles between 1973 and 1975. The introductory essay (" The
.Greeks Aren't Like the Others "), in the guise of a str:ucturalist manifesto, is in
fact a witty and incisive polemic against traditional philology's historicist treatment
of classical mythology and its sentimental idealization of classical culture. This
opening broadside reverberates throughout the book's later pages. Its combativeness bears unhappy witness to the uncompromising hostility between the vast
majority of traditional classicists and the structuralist left-wing. Yet Detienne
is an excellent philologist himself: his mastery of the ancient materials is profound, his traditional techniques faultless when he chooses to use them, and his
scholarship impeccable. But too often he refuses to make use of traditional
philological techniques that would in fact help to validate his structuralist analysis.
Such intransigence undermines his most stimulating essay, "The Orphic Dionysos and Roasted Boiled Meat" (ch. 4). Here, in a brilliant and complex argument, Detienne holds that the Orphic myth in which the Titans dismember,
boil, roast, and sacrificially devour the infant Dionysus is articulated in a culinary
code whose message is to attack and subvert" the whole politicoreligious system."
That system was allegedly based on the blood sacrifice of animals and the community's feast on their flesh. Marshaling the most far-flung evidence from over
a thousand year period, Detienne carefully maps the many significant variations
and oppositions the myth expresses contrary to normal culinary and sacrificial
practice in ancient Greece. Thus, he demonstrates that the myth's insistence on
boiling followed by roasting contradicts the mandatory sequence of the state
sacrifice. For the Orphics to create this myth was to deny a history of culture
from bestiality to civilization which was symbolically condensed in that sacrifice
and represented man's mediatory position between gods and beasts. While the
" totalization" of ethnographic context is the cornerstone of Detienne's argument,
his obdurate insistence on synchronic analysis and his adamant rejection of what
he derides as historicism needlessly weaken this esay. He treats the "politicoreligious system" and Orphism as monoliths, seemingly the same in all places
and at all times, and texts are consulted as evidence without regard for provenance or milieu. But Greek cities and their "politicoreligious systems" differed
greatly from one another, changing historically in very important ways; nor are
all the ancient sources equally trustworthy or of the same value; finally, Orphism" and its doctrines are open to the widest scholarly debate and confusion,
the ancient sources rife with contradictions, obscurities, and deliberate fabrications. To make his argument work, Detienne must unbend enough to submit
such generalizations about Greek politics and religion to a tougher Quellenkritik
and a more rigorous philological and historical analysis. It is possible to do
so without vitiating in any way his important insights.
Unfortunately, too, the argumentation of the various essays relies more on
(I
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rhetoric than on logic. Important evidence and analysis are laid down side
by side and too often the only bridge is a rhetorical, not a logical connection.
This weakness is most obvious in the book's longest essay, "The Perfumed
Panther" (ch. 2), in essence an examination of Ovid's versions of the Atalanta and
Adonis myth: "As a liminal place where socially dominant sexual relations are
as if suspended, the land of the hunt is open to subversion of amorous pursuits,
whatever their process or modality" (p. 26). It is a provocative treatment, but
frustrating in its amorphousness.
Yet despite such shortcomings, this book represents a major advance in the
study of classical mythology. What remains to be done is. more fully to integrate
structuralist or semiotic methods and techniques into traditional classical scholarship. This approach is long overdue.

K. R.
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Sir Philip Sidney: Rebellion in A1'cadia by Richard McCoy. New Brunswick,
New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1979. Pp. xiii + 230. $14.00.
The mythologizing of Sir Philip Sidney after his death as an Elizabethan culture-hero has its counterpart in his critical mystification as an intellectual-literary
saint. The respect and attention this author now receives are well~deserved:
considering most of the literature written in his own lifetime, his fiction, poetry,
and criticism are an historically remarkable achievement. But the kind of
revisionist analysis Richard McCoy sets out to do in his study is long overdue.
He detects in this writer's political life of "noble failure" (p. 9) unresolvable
conflicts between autonomy and submission that manifest themselves in the "inconclusive development, thematic contradictions, and problems of closure" (p.
26) of the major works. Because Sidney could not or would not reconcile, for
example, his need to exercise political initiative with the demand for prudent
submission to monarchical authority, McCoy argues, works like the Old Arcadia
and the unfinished New Arcadia" culminate in a pattern of ambivalence and evasian" (p. 216), the latter work incomplete supposedly because Sidney refused to
come to the" harrowing conclusions" (p. 163) towards which he was moving.
McCoy perceptively discusses the complex conflicts of sympathy and judgment
Sidney creates for his reader, noting that this author's demand for good will from
his audience is one attempt at disguising (at the end of the Old Arcadia, for
instance) the disturbing conflicts between romantic rewards and moral realities.
Both formalist and historical critics have tried to explain away such problems in
Sidney'S work.
Tactfully employing psychoanalytic insights, McCoy delineates Sidney'S personal style in all its self-destructive magnificence-a combination of passive
aggression and romantic heroism that is largely the product of sociopolitical
failure. He argues that this style and the the literature that reflects it should be
understood in the context of "the evasive, contradictory tendencies of Elizabethan culture" (p. 214). But what this study sorely needs is a better articu-
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lation of this historical matrix, definitions of the necessarily inconsistent Elizabethan sociocultural codes that would allow us to read Sidney's prose and poetry
with a better sense of their culture-specific meanings. l'v1cCoy's discussions of
the ending of the Old Arcadia, of the development of the episodes added in the
second book of the New Arcadia, and of the third book of the revised romance
are critically sensitive and informative, but he usually relates the persistent conflicts between autonomy and submission to Sidney's biography and to such
intellectual traditions as the Huguenot theory of subaltern magistracy and Calvinist moral determinism, rather than to the specific sociopolitical rules and
dynamics of late Elizabethan England. His treatment of Astrophil and Stella
(the weakest section of the book) would have benefitted from an examination
of the precise personal and social contexts of these coterie poems: we need to
understand how, for Sidney and his original readers, the vocabulary of love was
encoded by sociopolitical realities in such a way that it could express effectively
his frustrated ambitions.
McCoy is right to direct our attention to the Elizabethan court in which the
problematic relationship of courtier and Queen produced characteristic forms
of aggression and passivity, heroic posturing and impotent frustration-all captured in the anachronistic feudal ceremonials of the courtly tournaments and
tilts in which Sidney himself participated. But before we can finish the work of
demystifying this author-i. e. disentangling his work from the culturally- and selfgenerated myths that saturate it-we must extend the analysis McCoy has begun
in his book by taking a hard and systematic look at Elizabethan culture and
society. The result may be, as McCoy's conclusions suggest, a less aesthetically
neat and coherent Sidney, but it should be a more fascinatingly problematic one.
ARTHUR
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Tbe Living TeJ'/1ple: George HerbeTt and Catechizing by Stanley Fish. Berl{eley,
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1978. Pp. ix
201.
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In this modestly-proportioned book Stanley Fish seeks a way of talking about
Herbert's poetry that will do justice to the "simultaneous presence ... of order
and surprise." Too many critics of Herbert's poetry, Fish says, emphasize one
of these elements at the expense of the other, and he asks hmv it is "that the
same body of poetry has been the basis for reaching contradictory, but equally
persuasive, interpretive conclusions." The thesis of his book is "that the answer
to this question will be found in the forms, concerns, and conventions of the
Reformation cathechism."
Herbert himself was a catechist, of course, ,and in A Priest to the Temple
he tells us something of his method. Unlike many of his Protestant contemporaries, Herbert regarded catechizing as (in Fish's words) a H strategy" rather
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than an "examination." The goal of Herbert's catechizing is "not the orderly
disposition of a body of knowledge, but the arrival at that knowledge of a
respondent who has come to it himself." Let us substitute "poet" and "reader"
for "catechist" and "pupil." suggests Fish, and we will see that "rather
than being a sincere report of a mind in the act of changing, the poem is a
sincere effort on the part of the poet-catechist to change his reader-pupil's mind."
Hence the "order and surprise": the order is that of the poet-catechist, the
surprise the reader-pupil's.
Not only individual poems, but the three-part structure of The Temple and
the metaphor of the temple itself are best understood against the background of
the catechistical tradition. What Fish calls the "rhetoric of templehood" informs many of the popular catechisms, as in tIus introductory prayer to John
l\1ayer's abridged catechism in 1623:
Thou which art the Master-builder of thine owne house, settle me as one
of thy living stones upon the right foundation, Jesus Christ; in whom I may
daily grow up, till that all the building coupled together, groweth to an holy
Temple in the Lord.
And in the ambiguity of the word "building" (is it ,a verbal, signifying "work
to be done" or a noun, signifying "work done"?) Fish finds the "same contradiction that we shall find at the heart of Herbert's poetry ... that is, in its
equivocation between a structure that is precarious, shifting, and unfinished
(work to be done) and a structure that is firm, secure, and complete (work
already done)."
Further evidence that The Temple was composed on a cathechistical model
Fish finds in "The Church Porch" and" The Church Militant." "The Church
Porch" corresponds to the instruction that catechumens in the early church
received before being baptized and to the preparations that Christians of Herbert's day should make before receiving communion. And the content of "The
Church Militant" "corresponds perfectly to a standard feature of the early
catechisms, the narratio or 'history of salvation' as it is embodied in the career
of the Church."
Despite Fish's claim that his interpretation explains more of The Temple than
rival ones, the number of poems he actually analyzes is very small indeed, and
ninety-seven of the hundred and sixty-nine are not even mentioned by him, among
them" Aaron," " Affliction 2, 3, +, and 5," "The Bag," "The Coliar," "Employment 1 and 2," "Peace," "The Pulley," "Redemption," "The Temper 2," and
"Vanitie 1." Fish could of course talk about these poems as brilliantly as anyone
if he wanted to; it is not at all clear, however, that his discussion of them would
be illuminated by reference to the catechistical tradition. Of the poems he docs
talk about, his method, as might be expected, is more successful with some than
with others. Readers who want to test the method for themselves should read
the discussion of "Love III" on pp. 131-136.
WILLIAM
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William Hazlitt: Critic of Power by John Kinnaird.
University Press, 1978. Pp xv + 429. $22.50.

New York: Columbia

V\Then \Valter Jackson Bate assigned a prominent place to Hazlitt in his influential anthology, Criticis'm: the Major Texts (1952), he set in motion a
reassessment of Hazlitt's work and of his place among the great critics from
Dryden to Arnold. Since then, two biographies and two studies dealing with
Hazlitt's critical ideas have considerably sharpened the picture, and now (timed
to coincide '\vith the second centenary of Hazlitt's birth in 1778) John Kinnaird
offers us a comprehensive biography of the mind of this most versatile of writers.
Criticism, in this instance, must be understood in the widest sense of the term,
to include II philosophy, politics and society, painting and theater, manners and
morality and religion," as well as literature. And it is Hazlitt's conception of
po'\ver-political, psychological, and artistic-creative-that runs like a guideline
throughout this v,ridely ranging discussion. The boole explores \!,Tith admirable
clarity the life of a passionate mind engaged in the intellectual and political
turbulence of the time. It portrays an astute and influential critic.
But it also has another aim. It is intent on rehabilitating Hazlitt's reputation
in relation to his famous contemporaries and, further, on proving his "centrality" in English Romanticism. Bate, who thought that I-Iazlitt's importance
had indeed been underrated, presented him as II easily the most representative
critic in English romanticism." But Kinnaird goes further; he insists on moving
Hazlitt practically to the center of Romantic theory. As a result, a tone of
defensiveness enters the discussion. Kinnaird becomes overly sensitive to the
familiar charges: that Hazlitt practices a kind of critical impressionism in his
description of paintings, that he is merely a character critic when he writes about
Shakespeare, that the early disciple of Coleridge and Wordsworth, however rebellious, never became a great critic in his own right. He reprimands not only
such II insulting" detractors as George Watson but also the merely restrained
admirers of Hazlitt who do not quite appreciate, or else do not quite understand,
his originality as a theorist and practical critic. In a spirited peroration, he claims,
among other things, that Hazlitt It stands unrivalled as the English critic with
the best (that is, most consistently confirmed) record of judgment." In short,
Professor Kinnaird is generally more convincing as interpreter of Hazlitt's work
than as guardian of his reputation.
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Ge01'ge Eliot and the Visual Arts by Hugh Witemeyer. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979. Pp. xiii + 238. $19.50 .
.Of all the novelists whose greatness is an article of faith, George Eliot is most
in danger of impalement on her own wise aphorisms. Many of her most serious
readers even today would echo Henry James' reservations in the Atlantic Montbly
that her novels emerge strenuously from her U moral consciousness": "They are
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deeply studied and elaborately justified, but they are not seen in the irresponsible plastic way." Insofar as Hugh Witemeyer acknowledges that seeing is an
irresponsible act, his study of George Eliot and the visual arts breaks important
ground. He defines persuasively the essential pictoralism of George Eliot's imagination, painstakingly recovering the works of art that were important to her,
the values she found in them, and the ways in which they might have influenced
her novels.
It is good to recover the visual and tactile base of novels that are too readily
paraphrased into abstractions. Witemeyer's pioneering beginning is disappointing
only in the modesty with which it insists on its own boundaries. Like James's
George Eliot, Witemeyer limits his discussion of art to the morally paraphrasable.
He himself refuses to approach his material in "the irresponsible plastic way"
indispensable to important criticism as ,yell as to art, eschewing the "intuitive
school" of theoretical exploration he associates with Mario Praz in favor of a
meticulously limited listing of works Eliot is known to have admired. He leaves
us still in need of a study, not of sources and influences, but of the essentially
visual nature of George Eliot's perceptions, and the ways in which these tend to
subvert her overt moral positions. Witemeyer does not venture beyond the
knowable; all his material is worked into consistent moral schemes, a method of
limited value in approaching a novelist as sensitive as George Eliot was to
the indefinable power of the senses, the omnipresence of mystery and dread.
In the mainstream of Eliot criticism, ·with its proclivity for what in Eliot is
amenable to modern thought, Witemeyer is a maverick: he adheres staunchly to
the boundaries of the past, placing Eliot in a context of mid-Victorian aesthetic
assumptions. He refuses to approach her work ,vith the surgical audacity of a
Leavis, willing to amputate the novels, if necessary, in order to provide us with
material to which we can respond. Witemeyer's Eliot must be taken whole and
Victorian, even if she is often undigestable. Despite the infusions of light that
so often dissolve contour at crucial moments in her fiction, Witemeyer will not
even allow Eliot to be seen as a proto-Impressionist: her taste in art was that of
her age, representational and often full of cumbersome allegory. By our lights,
he admits, she seems a naive art critic, but he insists upon the limitations of
the Eliot he discovers. In his depiction of her taste as in his total concept, the
i~tegrity and the incompleteness of the book lie in its fidelity to its own limitations.
Much of Witemeyer's research is interesting and helpful. A solid discussion of
Eliot and genre painting breaks down our easy stereotypes of her affinities with
Dutch art, which actually influenced her very little; Witemeyer is precise in his
delineation of the sorts of genre painting that were important to her. The strongest discussion is a long, complex anatomy of varieties and philosophies of portraiture as it influenced, ambivalently, Eliot's characterizations. Witemeyer is shrewd
in his association of portraiture both with exemplary human types, echoing Eliot's
own need to uncover the human ideal in the real, and with an aristocracy that
seemed to her increasingly effete and decadent. Thus, in her own portraits, we
see her religious humanism at war '\vith her social disgust. The book could do
more with the class connotations of various forms of art, both in Eliot's works
and in her times. It lays the groundwork for such a study, as well as for a
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bolder, more theoretical and cross-generic exploration of the sort Witemeyer
repudiates as "intuitive." For Witcmeyer limits himself to what George Eliot
knew and said, ignoring the complex visual achievements of her novels. Finally,
we learn yet again that she was a Christian humanist, her exemplary visual pictorialism leading the reader to a moral apprehension of the real. All this indefatigable spadework leads to little that is new.
The importance of Witemeyer's topic, the interest of his research, but their
dissipation in innocuous conclusions may spring in part from his insistence upon
George Eliot as a representative Victorian rather than a woman out of her time
as well as within it. He tends to sec her exclusively as a composite of others'
influences. He defines her aesthetic as virtually identical with Ruskin's, which itself
is pruned of many divisions and ambiguities, and unblushingly identifies her opinions on all conceivable topics with those of George Henry Lewes. It seems unwise
as well as uninteresting to define as her lover's mouthpiece a novelist who wrote
so scathingly about docile women; here as elsewhere, the Eliot Witemeyer elides
seems a richer figure for study. Of her decision not to have children, he writes
highhandedly that it "suggests that she considered illegitimacy too cruel a
handicap to be imposed upon the innocent" (p. 124). Since little suggests that
Eliot ever wanted children, this argument hangs on a tenuous thread. This SOrt of
banal misconception of her character limits Witemeyer's study of both ".voman
and artist. Since he shows so little interest in the actual visual effects of the
novels, a potentially interesting chapter on Leighton's illustrations of Romola
(Eliot's only novel to be illustrated) becomes extraneous, a study of Leighton alone
rather than of his visual techniques in relation to the author's. Similarly, Witemeyer often substitutes Eliot's own pious rationalizations for the innovation and
complexity of her actual accomplishments. One feels throughout that he is
most at ease with George Eliot when she is placed at second hand.
For all that it does not do, \Vitemeyer's book is important in that it opens
for further study the wonderful topic of Victorian "wordpainting." We have
much to learn about the readerly response to Victorian painting, and our ingrained revulsion against "purple prose" has kept us from appreciating the
intense pictorialism of all Victorian literature. Most of all, we need to understand the marriage between the verbal and the visual to which so much Victorian
art aspires. Though Witemeyer's shunning of "intuitive criticism" gives him a
myopia that weakens this early tentative cross-generic study, I hope that many
readers and future writers will follow him through the door he has opened.
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The New Woman and the Victorian Novel by Gail Cunningham. New York:
Barnes and Noble, 1978. Pp. viii

+ 172. $21.50.

Olive Schreiner: Feminism on the Frontier by Joyce Avrech Berkman. St. Alban's,
Vermont:Eden Press Women's Publications, Inc" 1979. Pp. 88. $11.00.
At the beginning of Woman and Labour (1911), Olive Schreiner states that
"wherever there is a general attempt on the part of women of any society
to readjust their position in it, a close analysis will always show that the changed
or changing conditions of that society have made woman's acquiescence no longer
necessary or desirable." Her declaration would make an excellent epigraph
for both of the books under review. The "New Woman" phenomenon
in late nineteenth-century literature could never have occurred if social conditions had not already changed so much that new \vornen of some kind
were necessary for the survival of society. So tOO, Olive Schreiner's contemporary
fame and present-day obscurity rest in part on her embodiment of her generation's
attempt to change the conditions of that society. Both of these books are to be
welcomed as part of a larger revaluation of literature at the end of the nineteenth century. Although the authors leave many questions unans\vered, they
have laid a solid foundation for others to follow.
The New Woman and tbe Victorian No~vel begins with a description of the
themes of "Marriage, Morality and the Model Woman" to be found in
Victorian fiction. Since Cunningham is outlining dominant sterotypes she concentrates on such minor fiction as East Lynne (1861), The Clever Woman of the
FfI77Zily (1865) and Ruth (1853). The passive, pure or priggish women described
will be familiar to all readers of Victorian fiction, though many might feel that
Cunningham has oversimplified the issues in an effort to demonstrate convincingly what the New Woman fiction was revolting against. Far more useful is
her succinct and effective analysis of the works of Grant Allen (author of the
notorious The Woman Who Did [1895]), Sarah Grand, "Iota," and Emma
Brooke, the most famous proponents of the new fiction. All of these writers,
and many others, achieved fame and large sales during the mid-nineties for
advocating a new model of sexual purity. A New Woman was to be educated
in regard to sexual matters (the effects of syphilis was a frequent theme) so as
to understand and wisely control her own-and her lover's-sexual impulses.
This call for sexual education was accompanied by a vigorous attack on the
current forms of marriage. This, far more than the question of redefining
purity, aroused more traditional critics against the New Woman fiction. Grant
Allen's "woman who did" refuses to marry on principle, though she remains
intensely faithful to her chosen lover; she bears a lifetime of social ostracism for
her fidelity. One of the central paradoxes of this fiction, particularly well analyzed by Cunningham, is the emphasis on the necessity of greater freedom for
women and the concurrent price that must be paid by its pioneers. Death,
nervous disorders and unhappiness dogged these idealistic women.
Many readers will be most interested in the chapters on Hardy, Meredith and
Gissing, discussing the ways in which these men-all" major" writers in contrast
to the almost exclusively female "minor" writers-used the New Woman theme
for their own purposes. They shared with their contemporaries the prevailing
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discontent with sexual mores and marriage, but in all three Cunningham traces
a preference for traditional female virtues, untouched by modern corrupting ideas.
Everard Barfoot, in The Odd Tl1 omen (1893), has endless examples of men
destroyed by the ignorant behavior of their wives. Even Widdowson, clinging
to Ruskinian notions of wifely duty, is actually correct in assuming that Monica
is untrue to him in thought, if not in deed. But we never see the effects of
drunken or feckless husbands on upright women, as we do in the stories of
George Egerton (Mary Chavelita Dunne). Hardy'S women no matter how high
spirited and intelligent, arc also temptresses entrapping men so that they never
fulfill their ambitions. Indeed, capriciousness and childishness characterize virtually all of Hardy'S heroines. No wonder contemporary feminists saw Hardy'S
heroines as "men's women,)) and disliked the "irresistable fascination" so many
male critics praised.
Cunningham's work has many strengths, which make its weaknesses more
disappointing. Although the literary links between the popular and the prominent writers are well sketched, Cunningham has narrowed her terms of
reference too exclusively to the literary and therefore has failed to place her
theme in the necessary wider context. The relationship of this" new» literature
to the social and political movements of the times is barely considered. Emma
Brooke, author of Tbe SupeTfluous TVoman (1894), was an early student at Newnham and an active Fabian. Sarah Grand was a leader in the suffragist cause. Why
sexuality and marriage came under attack during these years is never explored.
Nor is rhe abrupt decline in interest in these issues in the late nineties (Oscar
Wilde's trial and the consequent suppressing of sexual freedom are not mentioned). Tbe New W01J1an and tbe Victo1'ian Novel suffers from the modesty of
its aims; a more ambitious theoretical base which included social and literary relationships would have made this a major work
The absence of Olive Schreiner from Cunningham's book is symptomatic of
its weaknesses. Schreiner (1855-1920) is mysteriously forgotten, perhaps, as Joyce
Berkman says, because she doesn't fit into any category. She initiated the New
Woman theme in The Story of An African Farm (1883), and wrote widely
on sexuality, feminism, eugenics, imperialism and socialism. In her life and works
she embodied many of the goals the fictional heroines of Cunningham'S book
struggled so ardently to achieve. Close friends with such pioneers in social and
sexual thought as Edward Carpenter, Havelock Ellis and Karl Pearson, Schreiner
was in touch with the leading ideas of her time-and made a significant contribution to them herself. She insisted upon the importance of sexuality in a
''loman's psychic makeup, was a cultural relativist who defended African and
Boer culture, and was a staunch pacifist. Throughout her life she suffered for
her beliefs, from such petty annoyances as being repeatedly thrown out of her
lodgings by irate landladies (she admitted men to her rooms whenever they happened to call) to suffering house arrest and the burning of all her books and
papers during the Boer War. Her debilitating asthma attacks, like the neurasthenia of the fictional New Women, were clearly rooted in unresolved aIL-TIety
about how to combine and fulfill her personal needs and political beliefs.
The little criticism that exists of Schreiner has concentrated on defending
her place in English or African literary history. Olive Schreiner: Feminism on
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the Frontier, in contrast, looks at the totality of Schreiner's output, placing it in
its appropriate historical context. At times Berkman suffers from the opposite
defect of Cunningham; she provides so much background that Schreiner's
works get lost. I would have liked more about Schreiner's literary innovations;
for instance, her use of dreams and allegories as a means of expressing states of
mind was very attractive to her contemporaries, though they did not imitate her.
Berkman does not always capture the excitement and energy of Schreiner's life and
ideas-her prose is occasionally turgid and she tends to cover too much ground
too quickly-but she has done a valuable job in placing before the reader Schreiner's major strengths and weaknesses. As she explains, Schreiner's vision of
woman's future and her analysis of woman's nature and social role were particularly penetrating. The passionate, thwarted feminism of Lyndall, heroine
of African Farm, went far beyond New Woman polemics. Clearly a full-scale
study of Schreiner's literary achievement is needed, specifically treating her
work in the context of the period. In the meantime, Berkman's monograph will
help to redress the undue neglect of Schreiner by Cunningham and other
literary critics.
MARTHA VICINUS

Indiana University

Failure and Success in America: A Literary Debate by Martha Banta. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 19i8. Pp. 568. $30.00 cloth; $12.50 paper.
This book claims the best of American writing is found in those literary
achievements which demand "more than survival" but "less than perfection"
(3). Banta presents an exclusively national reading of American literature
dependent upon the transformation of literature into solely the expression of
ideas in words. In effect, the book understands American literature to be one
long and argumentative answer to the Franklin of the Autobiograpby- 1. c., to
the man whose care about achieving success and the appearance of success was
not marred by worry over that separation. Thus her essentially American
writers, among \-vhom Emerson, Thoreau, William and Henry James, Twain,
Henry Adams, Gertrude Stein, and Norman Mailer are the most important,
succeed insofar as they recognize, accept, and then overcome failure.
They first reaffirm the "force of the idea" (179) of American as sacred
experience by reconstituting success as "aesthetic and moral" rather than" tangible and material" (133). They then provide to us and themselves what is for
Banta the enduring moral lesson of our national literature: a constant battering
by the reality principle which elicits a resistance to the siren call of the ideal.
They and we must learn, in the words of Henry James at age 13 to his sister,
Alice, to find our" pleasures under difficulties" (257). At the COSt of treating
philosophy and literature as identical systems of signification, "\Villiam James
occupies a particularly prominent place in the argument as the exemplar of those
"really tough imaginations" because he teaches us to locate "the topas (good
place) in the eutopos (no place) " (450).
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This thematic, ideational, and elitist approach to American literature is
perfectly congruent with OUf major critical traditions, especially as it measures
the writings by standards necesarily prior and extrinsic to them. For Banta,
American literature is a category as ideal as it was for Margaret Fuller in 1846;
both are able to discuss "what does not yet exist" (47) and do, although at
the cost of ignoring Emerson's warning that we pay as much attention to "what
they were" as "what they designed." The preference for design has the consequence of widening the scope of literature; letters, journals, diaries, biographies,
lectures, and memoirs are now available for the argument. However, correct
and desirable as it is to include these as literature, two drawbacks vitiate the
approach. Rather than applying the skills of literary criticism to these materials,
Banta presents them as if their non-fictional status privileges their gloss on the
fiction. Even worse, she finds herself relying too much on weaker fictional
texts, as if the worse the book, the more typically American. Nowhere is this
more so than in the use of Norman Mailer; the argument depends upon his Of a
Fire on the JUoon in which self-consciousness becomes self-parody for Mailer,
Banta, and America.
Despite the cmbarrassing presence of Franklin, treated here much as he was
by D. H. Lawrence almost sixty years ago, Banta's American literature is a
timeless construct from the Puritans to the prurient. Put more bluntly, history
is an empty category here, capable only of marking the gross swings from optimism to pessimism and half-way back Although she denies that the ideal may
serve to indicate radical social and political alternatives, Banta sneaks it in the
back door as the standard of literature and culture through a disdain for and
dismissal of mere "data." An unfortunate consequence, although one not
explicit in the text, is the development of a category of Unamerican writers
and writings. Cooper, certainly as obsessed as any American with failure and
success, is one; so too are Hawthorne, treated primarily as if he were the author
of unfinished romances, and Melville, at best a springboard back into the more
comforting world of Emerson and Thoreau. My guess is that the skepticism of
these writers, especially about the nature of language, and in the case of the
latter two, their refusal to provide a key in non-fiction to the American qualities
of the fiction, makes them particularly resistant to her approach.
An ontological certitude shapes the consideration and criticism of American
literature and culture. Royce and James are permitted to argue absolute versus
subjective knowledgc; but the nature of being and the nature of the subject,
defined variously as the individual, literature, and the nation, are unchanging and
immediately accessible. The worlds of facts and of words become transparent
media through which the truth always shines. Norman Mailer supposedly
responds directly to Henry Adams; more dangerously, we learn that Samuel
Sewall is "a member of the generation contemporaneous with Goodman Brown"
(299), a contention which not only blurs the distinction between history and
fiction but which denies that Hawthorne's historical fiction is predicated upon
the existence of Sewall and his fellm.vs. Thus not only history, but intention,
surprisingly enough, matters little; once again we confront the news that American
literature is marked by the meaning and stress placed upon the adjective while
the noun drowns in its wake.
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IVletaphor and idea dominate the form and content of Failure and Success in
America to the exclusion of all else. Indeed, Banta refuses to distinguish metaphor as one specific means of gaining and organizing knowledge. She remarks
that the "destructive movement away from 'mothers' is crucial to many of
Melville's narntive structures" (72), a reading which somewhat perversely
ignores the greater impact of "fathers)' in these texts by citing only Pierre.
Further, by setting" mothers" in quotes, Professor Banta indicates her awareness of its use as metaphor; yet the form of her argument forbids the exploration
of mothers except as metaphors. Ishmael's near-destruction thus follows abandonment of the land, his "mother," for the sea. Why he should be so foolish
is not explained; nor is it apparently meaningful that this mother is metaphoric
rather than actual.
Clearly this is no standard academic treatise (except in the ,vorld of American
Studies and its preference for the" unscientific method") although it makes one
wish it were. In place 9f readings of particular texts, with the exception of The
American and Huckleberry Finn, we get brief allusions which slide into other
texts on the basis of a word and a pun-sometimes those of the authors, sometimes not. A discussion of Thoreau's gratitude that he was born in the "nick
of time" leads to William James' talk of "my nick" and then to "Old Nick"
himself (204-05). Somewhere, too, Nick Carraway obtrudes his name and presence. Rather than devise and defend her own methodology, seemingly an unnecessary and always an unwelcome task for American cultural critics, Banta
adopts that of her authors. Their interest in and fascination with the transformations of language and their assumptions about the role of consciousness
become hers; Thoreau's hope and Adams' despair seem equally true and mark
the limits of the debate rather than its beginning.
The metaphor for the argument as a whole is that of a "house," surely
the most prevalent and prominent of American tropes. Whereas the critic often
tries to provide the blueprint, Banta gives us a tour through a labyrinthine
mansion filled with members of the family: Waldo and William James sit on
the porch, bid us welcome, and assure us we have nothing to fear; Henry James
stands in a corner of the drawing room observing us observing him; Mark Twain
swaps lies -with the servants in the kitchen and claims their life is real because
it is so determined; Henry Adams ,vaits in the study for his call to service; Henry
Thoreau takes the hot, uncomfortable room under the roof in the belief he has the
best view; Norman Mailer shakes the ashes down in the furnace and tells
Bigger Thomas the secret is to get the fire even hotter; and Gertrude Stein's
postcard, perhaps a bit hard to read, lies on the hall table. If I have caricatured
these writers, I have not violated the text of Failure and Success in America.
They are frozen in a world of metaphors, a paradoxical fate given the nature of
metaphor, but an inevitable one when the tension which characterizes metaphor
and literature is collapsed.
We do not really learn somehing new about these writers ,and America from
tIllS book. Instead, we are forcibly reminded just how concerned and obsessed they
were with success, a point worth reiteration. But we should question a conclusion that claims Thoreau or Adams or IVlailer, individually or together, wish
to teach us to be content with "just enough." History, psychology, audience,
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and intention arc missing from a book which seeks not so much to explicate and
evaluate the literary debate about failure and success as it desires to become the
latest addition to a continuing discourse. It is not enough.
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A1ark Twain as a Literary Comedian by David E. E. Sloane. Baton Rouge and
London: Louisiana State University Press, 1979. Pp. xi + 280. $12.95.
This book performs several valuable services. Its major one, its very raison
d'etre, is to challenge a view which, after Kenneth Lynn's lWark Twain and
Southwestern Humor, has been virtually official. As Lynn's title implies, this view
assumes that Twain's humor was born and raised in the Southwest, among the
likes of Augustus Baldwin Longstreet, Johnson J. Hooper, George "V. Harris, and
Joseph G. BaMwin. Sloane traces Twain's humor to a different source, the
literary comedy of the Northeast, to such figures as Orpheus C. Kerr, Petroleum V. Nasby, and especially Artemus Ward, who is significant enough to
get a chapter from Sloane all to himself.
Sloane is not merely concerned with lVlark Twain's genealogy, however. At
issue is the meaning and significance of Twain's humor, hence of Twain's
career as a whole. Sloane's demonstration of his genealogy is accordingly
thorough: more than fifty pages, over a quarter of the text. The Southwestern
humorists, he notes, all of whom depicted a rural world, were undemocratic,
unsympathetic to the common man. They made their fun at the expense of the
vernacular figures they depicted. In their frame narrators they established an
unvernacular elitist norm. The literary comedians, on the contrary, did not
deal with disparities by dividing their narratives between an elite and a vernacular style. In their work, Sloane points out, the vernacular has the field to
itself, in the figure of a single (and singular) narrator who handles disparities with
deadpan irony. The literary comedians were, then, largely motivated by social
ethics, and their persuasion was liberal, their norm democratic, their biggest
grudge the power of the urban corporate elite. We need only cite these items
to see how well they fit Twain, as characteristically as his white suits.
Sloane's book performs another service by examining Twain's career in terms
of his development of literary comedy, demonstrating thereby a real unity in
all of Twain's bewildering variety. He shows us how Twain kept realizing,
in a single figure or voice, the many different posssibilities inherent in literary
comedy. He managed as no one before him had to evolve a voice rich and
flexible enough to handle sustained narrative and finally the novel form itself.
Thus Sloane helps us appreciate continuity in Twain's career as a whole and
between individual discrete works.
Sloane's thesis is incisive enough to enable him not only to perceive important
connections between ''lorks, but also to examine anew the energy and form of
indivi'dual works. In the tradition of the novel, for instance, Huck Finn '>vas
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something new, but in the tradition of literary comedy, Sloane demonstrates, he
I was a familiar figure, the deadpan ironist on stage, at work. But in the figure of
Huck the literary comedian becomes" a visionary hero," and that, Sloane argues,
constitutes his genuine originality. Thus Sloane raises the issue-unresolvable,
finally, but crucial-of the extent of Huck's self-consciousness, the actual nature
of his innocence. He helps us realize how ambiguous :a character Huck is. With
his thesis Sloane is also able to show us-to cite only one other instance-how
Hank Morgan is not an ass who stumbled into a novel, but rather is a consummation of Twain's evolution as a literary comedian. His self-contradictions
are hereby present and accounted for: they amount to the different offices
which literary comedy traditionally served-" political argument, economic reasoning, professional ethics, comic humanism, and literary burlesque "-but in
Twain's hands put to more serious work, a critique of modern democratic civilization itself, and ending up, significantly enough, with an admission of that
civilization's futility. Sloane argues in effect that the novel's failure, as most
critics construe it, is actually its SDccess: the novel is about the failure of the
ethos implied in literary comedy and embodied in the person of Hank Morgan.
It is an interesting argument.
Sloane examines in detail .a number of other works: The Gilded Age, The
Prince and the Pauper, The American Claimant, and Pudd'nhead Wilson. His
approach is chronological, starting with Twain's journalism, and his omissions
are easily defensible, with one exception. He does not go beyond Pudd'nhead
Wilson, which means he neglects The Mysterious Stranger. To be sure, The
Mysterious Stranger waS never finished, but it is an important document nonetheless, and Satan, though he is not the narrator, is nevertheless a character we could
reasonably call a literary comedian. But his type of humor is different from
I that defined by Sloane, and that difference may account for his omission. For
Satan is stricdy antithetical, anti-ethical, anti-egaliterian, anti-ideal, anti-empirical,
and anti-historical. He reminds one, in many ways, of the vernacular figures of the
Southwestern humorists, though he does not speak in dialect. But he did not
arise ex nihilo in Twain's later career. For as James M. Cox has shown 'Us (in
The Fate of Humor), there was something anti-ethioal in Twain's humor all along,
indeed, there is something anti-ethical, anti-serious, in the nature of humor as
such. Sloane acknowledges Cox, but he does not give Cox's thesis sufficient
attention. He insists too strictly, too narrowly on his own, and at times it
misleads him. Twain enjoyed blowing ethics to bits at least as much as he
liked to preach. In his deep heart's core there was anarchy as well as a democratic ideal. His later nihilism and despair did not emerge in spite of the values
implicit in his humor, as Sloane thinks, but as a direct result of realizing those
values.
At other times Sloane's thesis, or more precisely his focus, keeps him from
seeing certain important issues implicit in his discussion, issues that deserve
I
explicit consideration. Are literary comedy and sustained narrative, for instance,
truly compatible? To understand that Hank Morgan is a literary comedian is
genuinely helpful, but I for one cannot help but think that therein, precisely
lies his weakness as a narrator/protagonist of and in the novel. A literary
comedian, in other words, may by nature be fit only for one-night stands, not
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for the extended engagements required by the novel. Perhaps, however, the
two modes can live successfully together in the same structure. The issue
needs thinking about. So does the issue of humor. Perhaps there arc different
kinds of humor-essentially different-and perhaps Twain practiced both (or all
three, or four, as the case may be). Hence, it may be, the richness of his
humor-the play of Southwest and Northeast off against one another-and hence
too the self-divisions that would not, finally, let him stand on any faith or hope.
These are a couple of important issues concerning which Sloane makes assumptions rather than examinations. But he does raise the issues, and thus he not
only defines a valid perspective for regarding Twain, he provokes thought that
goes beyond his own discussion.
JEFFREY

L.

DUNCAN

Eastern Alichigan University
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Dos Passos: Artist as American by Linda W. Wagner. Austin and London:
University of Texas Press, 1979. Pp. xiv + 220. $14.95.
Professor Wagner's study of Dos Passos is balanced, sane, modest, learned,
appreciative, and brief. Therein is an acomplishment which is more remarkable
than at first might be recognized, for the abiding quality of Dos Passos' own
accomplishment peculiarly evades assessment, despite all of the plain-speaking that
is in it and despite all of the sprawl.
It is to be recalled that Dos Passos was once a contemporary master and that he
was not only acclaimed but was also informative. In a period which was comnutted to the idea that" both politics and the arts must derive their power from
a common center of energy"-the phrase, astonislungly, is Allen Tate's-Dos
Passos seemed, better than anyone else, to have created the shapes appropriate
to the central energy. It helped also, of course, that in the 1930's his political
attitudes were generally perceived to be correct, although perhaps a little bit
ornery on the side of artistic freedom. All of that was long ago, however.
Dos Passos continued to write, voluminously, to the end in 1970, and he did not
change, but the times did, and the enterprise which had combined a political
and a literary radicalism into a single expression, by the 1950's and 1960's came
to seem to be the utterest conservatism. What had been an effort towards discovering a new and liberating version of the American tradition was an antiquarian
crotchetiness. Where once the villains in Dos Passos' America had been the
Military, or Andrew Carnegie, or Frederick Taylor (of the Taylor Plan), the
tyrants who snppressed individual liberties were, latterly, bureaucrats of the
mode of Roosevelt's J\Tew Dcal, and Roosevelt himself, in the District of ColU11lbia trilogy, and the union movement as it had become Big Labor, in A1.idcentury.
The message was what it had been-" The theme is freedom," as Professor Wagner
~ays, quoting Dos Passos-and the message was not necessarily unwelcome, but
It lacked the context of a broad, sympathetic, and somewhat organized movement. Lacking such, there was no longer much of a definable urgency in the
presence of Dos Passos.
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And now to look upon the enormous amount of the \vork would seem to
constitute either an invitation to scholarship in the most dreary meaning of the
,vord, Of an invitation to polemical celebration by subtraction-at one point or
another, according to individual bias, he was one of us-or the task \vould seem
to prescribe puffery. But Dos Passos' politics at every major point is lacking in
sectarian purity, and puffery is likely to be just that because in truth not all of
the approximately fifty books are wonderful, and Dos Passos did not write a
Balzacian or Faul1merian kind of opus in which the pieces might be seen to be
fitted intricately each to each to create a grand and singular design, nor was Dos
Passos even in the major moments a powerful originator of forms and language.
There is nothing in the sometimes celebrated technical devices of M anbattnn
Transfer and U.S.A. which Dos Passos could not have picked up from others
among his contemporaries and immediate predecessors, notably~of course-Joyce.
He was, rather, an ambitious, fiuent, and skillful adapter of forms and languagc.
In her introduction Professor Wagner says that "The question today, critically, should be why Dos Passos' very important role in the development of
modern American fiction need be considered with any tinge of apology," and
that question, wistful-bold as it is and giving up so much ground as it does,
does have a pertinence. It is by no means a matter of certainty that Dos Passos
has indeed had any continuous "very important" role as an American literary
influence. Professor Wagner names three putative recipients of the influence:
Gunter Grass, E. L. Doctorow, and Norman Mailer. But Grass (disregarding
the fact that Danzig is not an American town) obviously is beholden to many
teachers and to Dos Passos, if at all, much less than, say, to Dante; Doctorow's
technique of working real names from the recent past into narrative fictionpresumably that is \vhat Professor Wagner is referring to-has many modern
sources (Joyce, again, preeminently); and, as for Mailer, it was only in the
first novel that he showed a clear indebtedness to Dos Pass os, and the great thing
about Mailer is that formally every one of his novels has been a frcsh beginning.
But the" tinge of apology" which any serious discussions of Dos Passos would
in fact seem to entail, in its turn, leads to a large problem, the only answer to
which probably is grace and flexibility.
There arc other American writers approximately of Dos Passos' gencration
who are much lil{c Dos Passos. Archibald JvlacLeish is onc. Carl Sandburg is
perhaps another. These arc men who had virtues in such abundance that attention
would seem to be compulsory. As writers they v.rerc, persistently, ycry shrcwd and
ycry adept and always at least moderately im'cmivc, and they were ambitious in
the very best sense: they were writers first of all. \Vhen other blooming geniuses
faded, they wcnt on. At the same time thcy were, at least in \\·hat they
rcyealed in their writing, wonderfully decent men for whom literature was a
way of doing good. Given some access in each instance to some special materials
of passion-in Dos Passos' case there was the matter of his pcculiar hmily situation,
his position as a kind of royal bastard-they mostly chose breadth and citizenship. Their careers arc ac1mowlcdgcdly monumcntal whilc the sum of what they
actually wrotc is curiously obscure.
Tn fact Profcssor ,\Va!!ner rcads her way through Dos Passos in shiftingh'
,·;-trious ways. She som;timcs refers to biog.raphy. '- She tr.lces connections b~-
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tween earlier and later characters in the novels, although she docs not press a
case for a single opus. She does stylistic analysis and technical analysis. Sometimes she faults Dos Passos, especially for his failures to provide his characters
with greater psychological depth. Sometimes she does contextual analysis. But
that kind of inflection of critical attitudes would seem to be mandated if the
books arc at all to be made freshly apprehensible. Professor Wagner ends by
agreeing with someone else that Dos Passos was fundamentally "a good man."
Amen to that, and a good man is hard to find.
MARCUS KLEIN

State University of New York at Buffalo
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